I'm going to post more music eventually but also try to write more here and there.
I am reading a phenomenal book called Fire and Fury which is about the largely untold Allied bombing of Germany during WW2. There are hundreds of entertaining moments: portraits of charismatic madmen (Harris, Göring), intriguing and horrifying details about political and strategic tactics, and the gruesome experiences of pilots and civilians. Essentially, a few powerful men (Portal and Harris) decided that night-bombing of residential and cultural sites with heavy explosives and incendiaries would win the war. The Americans preferred strategic day-time bombing of specific industrial targets, and figured the Nazis were so heavily indoctrinated that bombing civilians would only intensify their war production. While both contributed to Germany's defeat, the war could have ended sooner had the Allies coordinated their bombing campaigns to defeat the military-industrial complex. While German citizens were boiled alive in canals from the firestorms, they became united, just as the Brits were during the Blitz, by the indiscriminate nature of civilian bombing. One sentence in particular struck me: "In one of the war's ironies, British angels were prepared to go where German devils feared to tread."
For example, one incredible story is when both Britain and Germany were developing radar (and radar-jamming) at exactly the same time. The Brits knew that a technique called Window (dropping metal strips from the planes in a coordinated manner by planes flying in single file) would allow a surprise attack knowing it would cause havoc for German radar. However, they feared using this tactic, as the Germans would retaliate. Nevertheless, a reluctant Churchill approved this strategy. In an incredible twist of fate, the Germans had developed similar technology, but their air commander had all the research destroyed, fearing it would lead to mutually assured destruction. A few weeks later, the firebombing of Hamburg (codenamed Operation Gomorrah) was a stunning success.
7 comments:
Thanks for the history lesson. Makes me want to back and read Slaughterhouse-Five again. While there is no doubt in my mind that those early British bombing expeditions into Germany were as much motivated by petty revenge following the Blitz as they were part of any grand strategy, I think the author’s analysis is a little skewed.
First of all, you have to keep in mind that radar technology was still in its infancy, and precision targeting wasn’t nearly as precise as the name implies. While the American strategic bombing expeditions were noble in intention, they were far from effective. Here’s something I found on wikipedia:
“USAAF leaders firmly held to the claim of "precision" bombing of military targets for much of the war, and energetically refuted claims that they were simply bombing cities. In reality, the day bombing was "precision bombing" only in the sense that most bombs fell somewhere near a specific designated target such as a railway yard. Conventionally, the air forces designated as "the target area" a circle having a radius of 1000 feet around the aiming point of attack. While accuracy improved during the war, Survey studies show that, in the over-all, only about 20% of the bombs aimed at precision targets fell within this target area. . In the fall of 1944, only seven per cent of all bombs dropped by the Eighth Air Force hit within 1,000 feet of their aim point.”
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategic_bombing_during_World_War_II#US_bombing_in_Europe
Daytime attacks on predictable and highly defended targets, however successful they may have been, would have been costly. And I don’t think the already meagerly supplied RAF, especially after the Battle of Britain, would have been able or willing to sustain such high casualties. Bombers were bulky and slow, and had to capitalize on whatever advantages were available to them. In this case, the cover of night and the element of surprise.
So yeah, while without a doubt morally objectionable, I can see how the indiscriminate bombing campaign conducted by the RAF would have made sense from a purely strategic standpoint, especially in a war that had to that point already seen the haphazard air bombing of so many European cities.
Moreover, while it’s true that the bombing had little effect on the German population, it’s wrong to say that it mobilized them in a way similar to the British following the Blitz, or that it any way delayed the end of the war. From what I gather, the German workforce, for the most part, kept on working not out of patriotism or a sense of solidarity in the face of a wantonly destructive enemy, but out of fear of the SS men who were constantly peering over their shoulders to make sure their work was up to par. Here’s a little something from that same wikipedia article that sort of discredits the argument that the attacks rallied the Germans into working harder:
“Much of the doubt about the effectiveness of the bomber war comes from the oft-stated fact that German industrial production increased throughout the war. While this is true, it fails to note production also increased in the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, Canada and Australia. And, in all of those countries, the rate of production increased much more rapidly than in Germany. Until late in the war, industry had not been geared for war and German factory workers only worked a single shift. Simply by going to three shifts, production could have been tripled with no change to the infrastructure.”
Anyway, just playing devil’s advocate here. Not condoning firebombing or anything. Definitely one of the darker chapters of the WW2 story.
…God, I’m a nerd.
You're not a nerd zzyrus. You're a douche.
First of all, read the book.
While it's true that precision bombing was a gross overstatement, the American and British strategies were completely different for most of the war (I've only gotten to the failed bombing of Berlin in 1943). The Allies agreed upon a strategy to disrupt the military-industrial production in order to stop zie Germans. Targets included factories, submarine pens, rail yards, etc. The Americans attacked numerous factories which created ball bearings (essential for military purposes) with efficiency. In 1943, Goring said that if the attacks had continued (or if the Brits had flown in to finish the job) the war could have been over in months. However, the Allied plan was re-interpreted by Harris as an invitation to bomb civilians because, ultimately, they were the ones greasing the war machine in the offices and armouries. The brass at RAF (apart from some incredible attacks on dams using bouncing bombs which they invented specifically for that purpose) were more concerned with the symbolism of war. They wanted to destroy morale. They had a list of 100 German cities and towns scheduled for destruction. If you consider the techniques of the bombing, 1/3 high explosives followed by 2/3 incendiaries, this was a recipe for firestorms. If you read the book you will understand how 'strategy' has different meanings for different people.
The RAF casualty rate was twice that of the USAAF, though Churchill often mixed up these figures. Hitler actually despised the day time attacks because they were so flagrant.
The argument on efficiency by that wikipedia article doesn't even make sense: "Until late in the war, industry had not been geared for war" What the fuck?
Yes, production went up in Canada, the US, and Australia because those nations because the war wasn't being fought in their backyard.
It's a blog feuersturm!
Anyway, the book is factual, unbiased, and entertaining as hell. Check it out.
No need for the name-calling…you dick. I wasn’t trying to cause trouble; just bringing up a few points that I thought were a little off. Guess that makes me a douche.
First of all, half of your argument is made up of dubious anecdotes (Goering said…Hitler said…), so I won’t bother replying to those.
I’m sure it’s a good book, but every author has an agenda, a point that they set out prove, even if it means playing around with the facts a little. The fact is that when the RAF started its bombing campaign in 1939, it did more or less exactly what you praise the US Air Force for having later done (daytime raids and careful strategic bombing). They went at it until it became clear that casualty rate was too high to justify continued action. And like I said, after having already lost about three quarters of all the planes that they had in the air during the Battle of Britain, it makes sense that they would have wanted to minimize casualties at that point. So it wasn’t just a matter of the Americans showing up with this brilliant idea that the Brits didn’t want to have to do with.
Then when the American Eighth Air Force began engaging in their own daytime raids out of Britain in 1943, they suffered similarly staggering casualties (a monthly attrition rate of about 30%…a lot of people). The only difference is that they had it easier than the Brits before them because this time around the RAF was largely distracting the German forces with its (admittedly deplorable) area-bombing expeditions. There definitely were a couple of early successes (notably the ball-bearing factory that you mentioned), but overall they didn’t justify the casualties (which were much higher than the British nighttime raids, I assure you). It wasn’t till later in the war, when they developed the technology to allow escort fighter planes to be up in the air longer (allowing bombers to venture deeper behind enemy lines with extra protection), that strategic bombing had any significant effect.
Again, I’m not trying to justify atrocities of war. I’m just saying that the sequence of events is a little more complex than the way you laid them out.
According to what you wrote (which I’m assuming is a summary of what you’ve read, meaning I can comment on the basic points without having to hear the “you haven’t read the book” argument), it seems the author is saying that the RAF commanders were completely clueless; that they opposed the common sense strategies of the Americans and engaged in seemingly random vendetta-like attacks on German cities; that their bomb raids were not only detrimental but had the opposite effect of what was hoped for, stirring the German workforce into working harder, “unifying” them and thus in some way delaying the outcome of the war.
I just think that the general idea here is an oversimplification, trying to boil it all down to a statement like “had it not been for this one thing, everything would have been so much simpler”. The RAF didn’t only partake in night raids because their boss was a bloodthirsty madman who didn’t want to listen to the Yanks. Granted, Bomber Harris was crazy, and made it clear that his intent was to kill German citizens. But there’s more to it than that. They already had experience with daytime strategic bombing from before when the Americans showed up, and the losses they suffered forced them out of that strategy. What they did subsequently was without a doubt heinous and bordered on war crime, but you can see how they came to it. And it comes down to more than simply a few “powerful men” going “ape-shit”.
The little wikipedia thing at the end that made no sense to you was meant to illustrate the fact that German war machine would likely have stayed strong regardless of the bomb raid tactics. Germany started off, like most other countries, with only part of it’s industrial complex diverted to the war effort. It was only later in the war that countries started diverting the whole of their economies to the war. So when the stakes went up and shit started to go down, the Germans still had plenty of excess resources and manpower to draw from, and would likely have kept on going regardless of how coordinated the Allied bombing attacks may have been.
For sure, you can look at the strategies from so many angles, and every historian has their unique lens from which they make their case. Especially when it comes to war. Sorry, I said douche because I thought you had just quickly read some shit on wikipedia.
Definitely, around this period, the RAF had to minimise air losses, they were in a defensive position. I didn't mention about the UK's past experiences with casualties and failure which you point out. And they relied on the Americans for much, including air crew. However, two events were occuring. Mutually assured destruction - after Hamburg (and Essen, and other major raids) the Germans began work on the Vergeltungswaffe (revenge-weapon I think) rockets. The other was the systematic destruction and targeting of symbols (churches, the historic disctricts of cities and towns) and civilians.
And yes, about a dozen powerful men on all three sides were overseeing the desctruction of life on a massive scale. But yeah, maybe apeshit wasn't the right word. In war, people become efficient apes.
The point about the industrial complex is one example. It becomes intensified in society when shit starts going down - around 1943, Germany started using teenagers for anti-aircraft defense.
fuck. I have to get up for work in 5 hours.
No worries...just having a bit of fun. Sorry I hijacked your post. Guess it's not every day you get to talk about WW2.
By the way, I think I may have phone stalker. Kinda creepy.
I have a phone stalker too! his name is Gurdru and he's from Fiji. I met him on the bus.
I now take a different bus.
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